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CASE NOTES

under the "single act" statute in spite of the fact that a tort had been
committed.
An era of rapid technological achievements has enabled corporations to
extend the scope of their activities. It has also become increasingly less
22
burdensome to defend actions in jurisdictions foreign to the corporation.
The Supreme Court has applied a flexible standard of reasonableness and
fair play to the requirements of due process, providing both latitude and
limitation to the exercise of state court jurisdiction over foreign corporations. 23 The outermost limits of jurisdicticn on the commission of a tor-

tious act have not been clearly defined, but it is apparent that the application of "single act" statutes to impose jurisliction over a foreign corporation on the basis of a single tort without prior business in the state satisfies
due process.

24

The holding in the present case is an attempt by the New York court to
extend its jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. While previous cases
have upheld jurisdiction when the damage: occurs in the state where the
action is brought, in this case jurisdiction was allowed in spite of the fact
that the damage occurred in another state. It remains to be seen whether
or not other courts will uphold the decision that "the occurrence of the
harm in Connecticut was incidental for jurisdictional purposes. ' 25
Harold Stotland
22 The doctrine of relative inconveniences has been applied in cases involving in
personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations. See Chovan v. E. I. Dupont De
Nemours &Co., 217 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich. 1963); Dahlberg Co.v. American Sound
Products, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1959); Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Prod. Co.,
89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
23326 U.S. 310 (1945).
24 McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. 111. 1961); Hutchinson
v.Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960).
2521 App. Div. 2d 285, 286, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216, 2).8 (1964).

PATENTS-ORIGINALITY OF INVENTION-SUGGESTIONS
TO INVENTORS
Polye, the junior party in an interference proceeding had isolated the
cause of failure in a certain type of electric switch. Uhl, the senior party
in interference, had discussed the problem with Polye and suggested the
incorporation of a certain chemical compound into the switch to obviate
the difficulty. Polye experimented with the idea of Uhl, reduced to practice the improved version, and filed a patent application. The Court of
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Custom and Patent Appeals, overruling the Patent Office Board of Patent
Interferences Polye v. Uhl, 51 C.C.P.A. 1067, 328 F.2d 893, 140 U.S.P.Q.
584 (1964), awarded priority to Polye on the ground that Uhl did not
show that he "invented or suggested the entire invention as embodied in
the combination of elements claimed in the counts in issue."' In another
recent interference case involving similar circumstances, the same court
applied a somewhat different test to determine the award of priority.
Here, the senior party had announced in a trade publication his discovery
of a new method for the effective elimination of undesirable sea lamprey
by the use of a chemical which would destroy its larvae. In a letter to the
senior party, the junior party suggested the use of another compound
which could be manufactured at a much lower cost than the first compound. The senior party performed extensive tests establishing the utility
and effectiveness of the suggested compound in achieving the desired
result. The test used by the court in awarding priority to the junior party
was: if the disclosure by the party offering suggestions had been such as
to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the disclosure
without extensive research and experimentation then priority is awarded
to the former. Applegate v. Scherer, _
C.C.P.A.
, 332 F.2d 571, 141
U.S.P.Q 796 (1964).
The issue of originality of invention in its broadest sense is presented
in many different situations in patent law, 2 and there is strong reason to
expect that more and more litigation will involve claims of derivation of
invention.3 This note is written to pursue a consistent set of principles of
151 C.C.P.A. at -, 328 F. 2d at 898, 140 U.S.P.Q. at 588. Count one in issue read (140
U.S.P.Q. at 587): "In a level switch ... the improvement which comprises a thinly fluid
dispersion in the electrolyte of at least five percent of a hydrogen acceptor. .. ." Count
two is in dependent form and specifies the hydrogen acceptor as "an unsaturated organic
solvent" and calls for the use of a catalyst. Counts three and four, also in dependent
form, relate to the chemical composition of the electrolyte. Claim five names the hydrogen acceptor as allyl alcohol.
2 For example, lack of originality is a defense to an infringement suit, De Laski v.
Thropp, 218 Fed. 458 (1914), affirmed 226 Fed. 941; Agawam Wollen Co. v. Jordan,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583 (1868). Origination of invention in third party may be the issue
in an interference where the two parties to the interference have worked independently,
Alpert v. Slatin, 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1343, 305 F.2d 891, 134 U.S.P.Q. 296 (1962).
An applicant for patent may try to overcome a reference claiming lack of originality
in or derivation by the author, In re Tansel, 45 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 834, 253 F.2d 241,
117 U.S.P.Q. 188 (1958). Of course, as a defense in an infringement suit, lack of originality has been regarded as a technical defense and looked upon with disfavor by the
courts, De Laski v. Thropp, supra. 35 U.S.C. 256 (1958) now provides that no patent
shall be invalid because of misjoinder or nonjoinder of inventors where the error was
not intentional and there has been no deception.
3 The Melman Report, Study No. 11 of Senate Res. 236, 85th Congress, 2nd sess. at 57,
(1958) recognizes the situation in contemporary research efforts, "In actual operation,

designation of a specified individual as 'the' inventor often becomes increasingly diffi-
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the law as it relates to the situation in which both parties to a patent
interference proceeding had communicated concerning the subject matter
of the interference counts prior to filing an application, and each claims
to be the sole inventor. 4 Title 35 of the United States Code in section 135
treats all interferences as involving an issue of priority, but the court in
the Applegate Case correctly points out that in an originality case, the
issue is not who is the first or prior inventor, but who made the invention,
noting: "An originality or derivation case, which this is, is quite unlike
a case involving independent inventors, between whom true 'priority'
5
must be decided."
Originality is a question of fact, and the burden is on the junior party
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence derivation on the part of
the senior party.6 This issue, when it is made, is ancillary to the question
of priority 7 and a party raising it has the :right to have it determined; all
other issues are subsidiary. 8 A party can raise questions of diligence in
reduction to practice 9 and suppression, concealment, and abandonment'
only when that party has satisfied the condition that he is an independent inventor, and not when he had derived knowledge of the invention
from his opponent.
When an inventor claims that his opponent in interferences has derived
the invention from him he narrows the issue considerably, but the courts
require that he lay a strong foundation of facts to substantiate his claim.
As held in Rider v. Griffith:" where the issue is originality, the party
cult, if not impossible, under modern conditions because of the division of labor and
interdependence which exists. Research is increasingly a joint process to which persons
with various technical skills contribute necessary parts."
4 35 U.S.C. 102 states: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-...
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented,...."
35 U.S.C. 115 (1958) reads: "The applicant shall make oath that he believes himself to
be the original and first inventor of the process, nmachine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or improvement thereof, for which he solicits a patent... ?'
5 141 U.S.P.Q. at 798. See, also Orange-Crush Co. v. American Ornamental Bottle
Corp., 60 F.2d 518, 14 U.S.P.Q. 171 (C.A. 4, 1932); Browning v. Johnson, 50 App. D.C.
335, 271 Fed. 1017 (1921); Baumgardner v. Hudson, 51 App. D.C. 150, 277 Fed. 552
(1922); Smith v. Pritchard, 58 App. D.C. 9, 24 Fed. 2d 274 (1928).
6 Keeleric v. Kistler, (P.O. Bd. Pat. Inter.) 128 U.S.P.Q. 442 (1958).
7 Kratz v. Calvert, 29 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1097, 129 F.2d 542, 54 U.S.P.Q. 264 (1942).
8 Moler v. Purdy, (P.O. Bd.Pat. Inter.) 131 U.SP.Q. 276 (1960).
9Browning v. Johnson, 50 App. D.C. 335, 271 Fed. 1017 (1921); Orange-Crush Co. v.
American Ornamental Bottle Corp., 60 F.2d 518, 14 U.S.P.Q. 171 (C.A. 4, 1932); Beall
v. Ormsby, 33 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 959, 154 F.2d 663, 69 U.S.P.Q. 314 (1946).
10Finch v. Dillenback, 28 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1171, 121 F.2d 459, 49 U.S.P.Q. 731
(1941); Stanley v. Gump, (P.O. Bd.Pat. Inter.) 116 U.S.P.Q. 483 (1962).
1133 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 884, 154 F.2d 193, 69 U.S.P.Q. 112 (1946).
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claiming derivation must show that he was in possession of the invention
before the date of the alleged disclosure and that his opponent had both
a motive and opportunity to learn it.
However, in a substantial number of cases involving originality, each
party honestly believes himself to be the true inventor, having made the
most significant contribution to the effort. There is usually no great dispute concerning the facts. As indicated by the two cases that introduce
this note, the courts are not uniform in applying a test in this latter
situation.
2
The circumstances may be illustrated by the case of Tolle v. Starkey'
in which the counts defined a method of electrostatically painting nonconducting articles. Tolle had suggested heating the articles before painting; and Starkey, while conducting experiments to make the idea practicable had discovered that it would work only when the articles were
heated to a certain minimum temperature. The court awarded priority to
Starkey holding that, despite the fact that Tolle's suggestion was the
"spark" which led to the final satisfactory result, the suggestion had not
been merely to perform experimentation to optimize the time during
which heat was to be applied. The fact was that the method as suggested
would not work unless the articles themselves were heated above a specific
temperature. That is, Tolle's suggestion of applying hot air was not operable per se. What the court was saying, without stating it explicitly,
was that Tolle's suggestion could not be put to practical use with only
the exercise of ordinary skill. Starkey had exercised inventiveness; though
admittedly not unrelated to Tolle's suggestion, it was independent of it.
As the Applegate v. Scherer case indicates, the matter must be approached in terms of who made the invention. The court must first
determine exactly where the invention lay before determining who made
it. The Patent Office Board of Patent Interferences deciding the case of
Stanley v. Gumpis phrased it this way: "Even if Gump et al had added
details not disclosed to them or inherent in Stanley's disclosure, this would
not be basis for award of priority in an originality contest, so long as
such details represented nothing more than the normal skill of the art."
Therefore, it must be determined who made the suggestion which constituted the inventive concept defined in the counts. 14 The disclosure
must not have been so broad that it required extensive research and ex1245 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 979, 255 F.2d 935, 118 U.S.P.Q. 292 (1958).
13 136 U.S.P.Q. at 486.
14 See, Van Otteren v. Hafner, 47 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 995, 278 F.2d 738, 126 U.S.P.Q.
151 (1960), where it was found that the first count contained "the essential features
of the invention," and the second count involved only features exhibiting mechanical
skill in an embodiment of the first count. See also, Barnet v. Wied, 39 C.C.P.A. (Patents)
882, 195 F.2d 311, 93 U.S.P.Q. 161 (1952).
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perimentation to implement 15 for this would indicate that there had not
been a complete conception of the invention.'6 One cannot claim that his
opponent has derived an invention from a suggestion which indicates a
desirable result without having disclosed to him any specific means for
17
obtaining that result.
In an originality case, where a disclosure does contain the elements of
invention defined by the interference counts, the inventor need not have
knowledge of all the advantages of his idea nor even that it will operate
effectively. To hold otherwise, as indicated in Applegate v. Scherer,
would mean: "....

that one could never communicate an invention thought

up by him to another who is to try it out, for, when the tester succeeds,
the one who does no more than exercise ordinary skill would be rewarded and the inventor would not be. Such cannot be the law."' 8
The test applied in the Applegate case, namely, that in an originality
contest it is sufficient for an award of priority that an inventor make a
disclosure which would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to
practice it without the exercise of the inventive faculty seems clearly to
be the most sound rule, being in accord with the philosophy that a
patent should be granted only to the one who advances the art. Consistent
application of this rule in originality cases requires that the substance, not
the formal wording, of the counts be construed to determine what constitutes the invention that has been defined by the counts, 19 and that
priority be awarded to the one who contributed the invention. A strict
construction of the interference counts may lead to the situation where
the actual inventor is defeated in a contest to claim his invention be15 O'Donnell v. Hartt, 22 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 958, 75 F.2d 195, 24 U.S.P.Q. 379 (1935);
Tolle v. Starkey, 45 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 979, 255 F.2d 935, 118 U.S.P.Q. 292 (1958).
16See, Raiche v. Foley, 27 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1 80, 113 F.2d 497, 46 U.S.P.Q. 224
(1940).
17 Barnet v. Wied, 39 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 882, 195 F.2d 311, 93 U.S.P.Q. 161 (1952).
18

332 F.2d at 573-74, 141 U.S.P.Q. at 799.

19 See cases cited supra note 14. In the matter o:- construction of the interference
counts, it is particularly important to note the distinction between an originality case
and a priority contest between two independent inventors. Indiscriminate use of wording out of context can lead to confusion as where the court in the Polye Case based
its holding on the proposition that: "the law is clear that every limitation in an interference count is to be considered material in determining whether a party should
prevail." 328 F.2d at 897, 140 U.S.P.Q. at 587, citing, as authority, Segall v. Sims, 47
C.C.P.A. (Patents) 888, 276 F.2d 661, 125 U.S.P.Q, 394 (1960) and Crome v. Morrogh,
44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 704, 239 F.2d 390, 112 U.S.P.Q. 49 (1956). Actually, both Segall
v. Sims and Crome v. Morrogh were priority conte;ts between independent inventors
and the holding of both cases was that every limitation in an interference count
is material in determining whether a party has the right to make the count, i.e., that
his application discloses the subject matter of every limitation in the count-and not
whether a party should prevail.
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cause his opponent has either substituted an element that is the equivalent
of one he disclosed, 20 or included a limitation in the count which resulted
from the exercise of mere technical skill in perfecting the invention and
does not lend patentability to the claim.
James Hill
20

See Nielsen v. Cahill, (P.O. Bd. Pat. Inter.) 133 U.S.P.Q. 563, 571 (1961).

REAL PROPERTY-TAX DEEDS-MAY A PERSON NOT OF
RECORD ATTACK ORDER ISSUING TAX DEED?
On November 12, 1958, property owned by Arthur T. McIntosh & Co.
was sold to Vera Place, the respondent, for unpaid 1957 general taxes,
and certificates of purchase were issued to her, describing the property
as: "Lot 20 and 21 Northwoods, DuPage County, Illinois (same as described in doc 659621.")' She filed a petition for an order directing the
issuance of a tax deed. Service was had upon Arthur T. McIntosh, in
whose name the property was last assessed, and notice was published in a
newspaper of general circulation in DuPage County. However, on July 2,
1959, Arthur T. McIntosh & Co. sold the property to Helen E. and
Joseph J. Bird. A tax deed was issued to Vera Place and recorded on
December 20, 1960. Otto C. Stephani acquired title from the Birds'
bankrupt estate on November 21, 1961, and recorded the Birds' deed and
his deed at that time. Chicago Title and Trust Co., as trustee for Stephani,
filed a petition seeking to set aside the tax deed; fraud was alleged in that:
(1) the property was insufficiently described;2 and (2) the notice was
published in a newspaper which was not calculated to reach the petitioner.
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
petition and remanded the case to the trial court for adjudication of the
fraud issue, stating, in effect, that petitioner had standing to attack the
issuance of a tax deed. In re Smith, 50 I11.
App. 2d 189, 199 N.E.2d 420
(1964).
Before analyzing this case, it may be well to review briefly the procedure followed in an annual tax sale proceeding. When taxes become
1 Supposedly the number of the plat of subdivision.
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 S 516 (1963) provides that if the legal description includes

the document number of the plat of subdivision, it shall be a good and valid description.
Appellant's argument here is that there are two Northwoods in DuPage County and
the document number included in the legal description was not that of the plat of
subdivision. However, appellee used the legal description of the County Clerk's assessment rolls and that which was on the certificate of purchase issued to her. Therefore,
the charge of fraud in this respect seems unfounded.

